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Abstract 
The current study explored implicit attitudes to life and death in a student population using both 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). 
The IAT was similar to one used in previously published researched in the context of the 
prospective prediction of suicide and self-harm. Two IRAPs were employed, one that assessed 
relational responses specific to death and life with respect to self, and a second that assessed 
relational responses specific to evaluations of death and life. The IAT replicated previous results 
found in normative populations. The IRAPs indicated “prolife” biases, as expected. However, 
they also failed to demonstrate the presence of strong “antideath” biases, and in one case a 
specific “death–positive” bias was found. The results observed on the explicit measures did not 
readily explain the absent or “prodeath” effects observed on the IRAPs. Indeed, participants 
reported a normative level of anxiety and fear of death. Implications for the study of implicit 
attitudes to death using the IRAP are considered.  
Keywords: Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, Relational Frame Theory, death 
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Life is good, but death ain’t bad either: Counter-intuitive implicit biases to death in a normative 
population 
 
The concept of death plays a central role in much of human culture, including religion 
and the search for meaning in life (see Kastenbaum, 2000; Neimeyer, Wittkowski, & Moser, 
2004). Indeed, a body of research demonstrates that reminders of our own mortality impact our 
behavior in important ways, such as on our conceptualization of self and personal values (see 
Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010 for meta analysis). From a behavior-analytic perspective, the 
conceptualization of death is inherently interesting, because death itself cannot be experienced or 
consequated and is instead constructed through the metaphor of sleep. It is therefore somewhat 
difficult to account for our conceptualization of death in terms of direct contingencies (Hayes, 
1992). Relational Frame Theory (RFT: Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) represents an 
attempt to account for such “emergent” or “derived” responding that occur in the absence of a 
direct history of reinforcement (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, in press for overview).  
 RFT’s core concept of “arbitrarily applicable relational responding” has demonstrated 
much utility in conceptualizing and modeling complex verbal behaviors, such as death and 
suicide (Hayes, 1992), self (Foody, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004) and metaphor (Foody et al., 2014). However, more recently, 
RFT researchers have also become increasingly interested in assessing such relational responses 
“in flight”, as they are emitted (see Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Biases in 
the strength of relational responding are more frequently referred to as “implicit attitudes” (De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009), and are assessed using such procedures as 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the Implicit 
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Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP: Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 
2010). The IRAP, in particular, was created with the explicit intention of assessing the strength 
or persistence of relational responding.  
A recent meta-analysis demonstrated that the IRAP has been used to explore a variety of 
clinically relevant domains, including self-esteem, depression, OCD, and substance abuse 
(Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). This study represents the first study to explore the 
utility of the IRAP in exploring attitudes to death. While we initially planned to group together a 
series of studies on this topic for publication, our initial findings produced a counter-intuitive 
effect that seemed worth of dissemination at this point. Additionally, as will be elaborated upon 
in the discussion, our results may have implications for a more systematic analysis of the IRAP 
as a measure of strength of relational responding itself. 
Previous research has shown that IATs that target implicit attitudes to self and death (i.e., 
using the categories self, others, death, & life) are prospectively predictive of self-harm and 
suicide attempts over and above established risk factors. These include clinical judgment, self-
report measures of impulsivity and hopelessness, a variety of routine risk assessment tools such 
as the Manchester Self-Harm Rule (Cooper et al., 2006) and the SAD PERSONS assessment 
(Patterson, Dohn, Bird, & Patterson, 1983), and the individual’s own self forecast (see Nock et 
al., 2010). However, it is important to note that the IAT does not permit the identification of 
individual, independent response biases. Indeed, the creators of the IAT have been assiduous in 
specifying that it is a measure of the relative (rather than absolute) strength of associations 
between categories. This has been argued for both conceptually (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) and empirically (e.g., Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; 
Pinter & Greenwald, 2005) on numerous occasions. For example, these authors point out that an 
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IAT that includes the stimuli “self”, “others”, “life”, and “death” (e.g., Nock et al., 2010) must be 
interpreted as a measure of the relative strength of associations between all four categories. For 
example, while somewhat verbose, these biases should be interpreted as either towards “self and 
life relative to others and death” or “self and death relative to others and life”. Specifically, 
whereas the IAT presents participants with all four categories on each trial (e.g., self, other, life, 
and death) and examines the relative ease of categorization (e.g., self–life and others–death vs. 
self–death and others–life), the IRAP only ever presents exemplars from one category in a pair 
(e.g., either self or others and life or death) on each trial, and requires participants to respond in 
opposing directions across blocks (e.g., “similar” vs. “different”). As such, four separate bias 
scores are produced, one for each “trial-type” (e.g., self–life, self–death, others–life, and others–
death). This ability to separate out the strength of individual category pairings may serve to 
uncover subtle effects that might be obscured within the IAT’s overall bias score (Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010).  
This study therefore tests the assumption made with previous research, whether explicitly 
or implicitly, that normative participants do indeed demonstrate specific “self–life” and/or “self–
not-death” biases (i.e., Dickstein et al., 2015; Harrison, Stritzke, Fay, Ellison, & Hudaib, 2014; 
Nock et al., 2010; Price, Nock, Charney, & Mathew, 2009; Price et al., 2014; Randall et al., 
2013; Tang, Wu, & Miao, 2013; Violanti, Mnatsakanova, & Andrew, 2013). Participants 
completed both a death–identity IAT and a death–identity IRAP that was created from the same 
stimuli. It was expected that a sample of normative participants would demonstrate overall “self–
life/others–death” effects on the IAT, but that effects on the IRAP would load onto a two specific 
trial-types: an assertion of “self–life” and a rejection of “self–death”.   
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A second IRAP was also included to explore implicit evaluations of death. While 
previous research on implicit attitudes to death has explored the associations between the 
concepts of (a) self and evaluation (i.e., “self-esteem”: Creemers, Scholte, Engels, Prinstein, & 
Wiers, 2013; Dickstein et al., 2015; Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2007; 
Glashouwer et al., 2010; Price et al., 2009; Price et al., 2014); and (b) self and death (i.e., 
“death–identity”: Dickstein et al., 2015; Harrison et al., 2014; Nock et al., 2010; Price et al., 
2009; Price et al., 2014; Randall et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2013; Violanti et al., 2013); no work 
has explored the association between death and evaluation. This is somewhat surprising, given 
the centrality of evaluations within many psychological theories that focus on death. For example, 
Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) is predicated on the 
assumption that awareness of ones own mortality is highly aversive, and argues that this serves 
as the motivator for humans’ ubiquitous need for meaning and self-esteem. Comparably, many 
theories of non-normative attitudes to death (e.g., suicidality) attempt to account for how life 
and/or self acquires aversive properties in the face of unbearable psychological suffering, often 
with explicit reference to an acquired loss of fear of death (e.g., Interpersonal Theory of Suicide: 
Joiner, 2005; Integrated Motivational-Volitional Model of Suicidal Behavior: O’Connor, 2011). 
This idea that death is aversive or evaluated negatively within ‘normative’ individuals, and that 
decreased fear of death is associated with suicidality, has been supported by a relatively large 
number of studies using self-report questionnaires (e.g., Ribeiro et al., 2014). In summary, given 
the centrality of evaluations of death to many theories, and the recent emphasis on the relative 
utility of implicit measures to traditional self-report methods (see Randall, Colman, & Rowe, 
2011), it is therefore somewhat surprising that no research to date has examined evaluations of 
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death using implicit measures. Consequently, a second IRAP was included, that assessed 
evaluations of death (i.e., life, death, positive, & negative).  
Finally, in addition to the death–identity IAT, death–identity IRAP and death–evaluation 
IRAP, a number of self-report measures were included in order to explore the self-report 
correlates of such implicit attitudes. Self-report measures of depression and hopelessness were 
included, due to their known association with non-normative attitudes to death (i.e., suicidality: 
see Brown, Beck, Steer, & Grisham, 2000). A number of additional exploratory self-report 
measures were included to assess beliefs in the afterlife, fear of death, and the relationship 
between an individual and their aversive mental content.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty-two undergraduate students (25 female, 17 male) aged between 18 and 51 years old 
(M = 27.8, SD = 9.6) were recruited from the student population at the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth. Participants completed the study individually in an experimental cubicle in 
the Department of Psychology. Inclusion criteria were self-reported fluent English, normal or 
corrected to normal vision, age 18–65, and full use of both hands. Participants reported having 
completed between 0 and 9 IRAPs previous to the current study (M = 2.60, SD = 3.08). It should 
be noted that, due to ethical approval constraints, self-reports of history of suicidal behavior were 
not collected. As such, the current study was conducted within a normative sample with an 
uncertain history of suicidal behaviors, rather than a strictly “non-suicidal” sample. A range of 
self-report measures was employed to establish the normativity of the sample (see below). 
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Measures 
Self-report measures included an assessment of individuals’ attitudes to death and dying 
using the Death Anxiety Scale (Templer, 1970), and belief in what comes after death using the 
Belief in the Afterlife Scale (Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973). Both depressive symptoms and 
hopelessness were assessed, based on their known relationship with suicidal behaviors, using the 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) and Beck Hopelessness Scale 
(Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974), respectively. Finally, we included the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire II, a measure of psychological flexibility, as an exploratory measure 
(Bond et al., 2011). 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II. The AAQ-II is a 7-item measure of 
psychological flexibility (Bond et al., 2011). That is, the ability to change or persist in behavior 
in the service of valued ends (e.g., “Worries get in the way of my success”). Psychological 
flexibility is a key process within Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999). Participants respond on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true), with possible scores ranging from 7 to 49. Internal consistency was excellent in the current 
sample (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .90). 
Beck Hopelessness Scale. The Beck Hopelessness Scale is a 20-item self-report measure 
of an individual’s hopelessness over the past week (e.g., “My future seems dark to me”), and has 
been shown to be a significant predictor of death by suicide in longitudinal studies (Beck, Steer, 
Kovacs, & Garrison, 1985; Beck et al., 1974). Each item has a binary (True/False) response 
format and is scored from 0–20, where higher scores represent greater levels of hopelessness. 
Internal consistency was good (𝛼 = .86). 
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Belief in the Afterlife Scale. This 7-item self-report questionnaire assesses individuals’ 
beliefs in the afterlife (e.g., “There must be an afterlife of some sort”: Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973). 
Participants respond using a 1 (disagree) to 10 (agree) scale and is scored from 0 to 70, where 
higher scores represent greater belief in the afterlife. It should be noted that specific beliefs about 
the afterlife (e.g., whether it will involve punishment or reward) are not examined, only whether 
participants believe death to be extinction of self. Internal consistency was good in the current 
sample (𝛼 = .89).  
Death Anxiety Scale. This 17-item self-report questionnaire assesses fear and anxiety 
around the act of dying and the finality of death using items such as “I am very much afraid to 
die” and “I often think about how short life really is” (Templer, 1970). It employs a true/false 
answer format. This scale was employed over other measures of death anxiety on the basis that it 
is one of the most frequently employed in previous research (see Iverach, Menzies, & Menzies, 
2014 for review). Internal consistency was found to be good in the current sample (𝛼 = .70).  
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale-21. This 7-item depression subscale asks 
participants about depressive symptoms in the past week (e.g., “I felt that life was meaningless”), 
and uses a 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time) 
response format. This subscale has been shown to correlate highly with other well-established 
depression scales such as the Beck Depression Inventory II (r = .74: Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). Internal consistency was excellent in the current sample (𝛼 = .92). 
Death Identity IAT. The Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) is a 
computer-based test that assesses reaction time biases. The current study employed the death–
identity stimulus set developed by Nock and colleagues (2010) that has been employed in 
multiple previous studies (e.g., Dickstein et al., 2015; Harrison et al., 2014; Price et al., 2014, 
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2009; Randall et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2013; Violanti et al., 2013). One small modification was 
made to the stimulus set: due to ethical constraints on asking university students about suicide, 
and in order to assess attitudes to death generally rather than suicide specifically, the stimulus 
“suicide” was substituted for the word “death”. The stimuli employed in the four categories (i.e., 
self, others, life, and death) are presented in Table 1. All procedural details of the IAT were 
standard (see Nosek et al., 2007 for methodological review).  
IRAPs. The structure of the IRAP employed in the current study was as described by 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010); see 
below). The task was programmed in Visual Basic 6, and the “2012” version of the program was 
used (Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 2012). Several parameters were identical across both IRAPs, 
and thus will be summarized here. Participants were provided with up to 4 pairs of practice 
blocks. If participant met both the mastery criteria on both blocks in a pair of practice blocks (i.e., 
accuracy ≥ 80% and median latency ≤ 2000ms) they were immediately moved to the test blocks. 
If they failed to meet the mastery criteria after four practice block pairs, the task ended. In 
accordance with the majority of previous research, three pairs of test block pairs were completed 
(e.g., Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Rönspies et al., 2015). The latency feedback message was 
set to “!”. The location of the response options remained static throughout the task.  
Death–Identity IRAP. The stimuli employed within the IRAP were drawn from those 
used within the IAT in order to make the two measures maximally comparable. The IRAP 
program required an even number of stimuli per category. As such, one additional stimulus was 
added to each category (i.e., “me”, “others”, dead” and “living”: see Table 1). The four trial-
types were therefore “self–death”, “self–life”, “others–death”, and “others–life”. The response 
options were set to “Similar” and “Different”. Specific responding rules were presented on 
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screen before each block. Responding rule A was “Please answer as if you associate yourself 
with death and others with life,” and responding rule B was “Please answer as if you associate 
yourself with life and others with death”. The order in which individuals were exposed to these 
blocks (i.e., rule A first vs. rule B first) was counterbalanced between participants in both IRAPs. 
 
Table 1. Stimuli used in the Death–Identity IAT and IRAP 
Label 1: self Label 2: others Target 1: death Target 2: life 
Myself 
My 
Mine 
I  
Self 
Me2 
Them 
They 
Theirs 
Their 
Other 
Others2 
Death1 
Die 
Funeral 
Lifeless 
Deceased 
Dead2 
Alive 
Live 
Thrive 
Survive 
Breathing 
Living2 
Note. 1Substituted the word “Suicide” as used by Nock et al. (2010); 2Used in IRAP only. 
 
Death–Evaluation IRAP. This IRAP attempted to target relational responding around the 
valence of life and death. Labels 1 and 2 were set to “living” and “dying”, respectively, target 1 
stimuli were set to positive-valence-high-arousal words (i.e., enjoyable, exciting, lovely, great, 
pleasant, and satisfying), and target 2 stimuli were set to negative-valence-high-arousal words 
(i.e., awful, distressing, hurtful, horrible, painful: see Table 2). The four trial-types were 
therefore “life–positive”, “life–negative”, “death–positive”, and “death–negative”. The response 
options were set to “True” and “False”. These words were selected following consultation of the 
Affective Norms for English Words battery (ANEW: Bradley & Lang, 1999) and the agreement 
of two researchers acquainted with the research area. Responding rule A was “Please answer as 
if life is pleasant and death is painful” and responding rule B was “Please answer as if life is 
painful and death is pleasant”. Due to their greater complexity, the internal consistencies of the 
two IRAPs are reported in the results section.  
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Table 2. Stimuli used in the Death–Evaluation IRAP 
Label 1: life Label 2: death Target 1: positive Target 2: negative 
Living Dying Enjoyable 
Exciting 
Great1 
Lovely 
Pleasant 
Satisfying 
Awful 
Distressing 
Hurtful 
Horrible 
Painful 
Upsetting 
Note: Label stimuli appear at the top of the screen and target stimuli in the middle of the screen. 
1 Vernacular usage of the word “great” in Ireland is most frequently as a synonym of positively 
valenced words such as “excellent”, rather than denoting quantity or rank (cf. “substantial” and 
“prominent”). 
 
Procedure 
All experimental sessions were conducted in individual experimental cubicles. This was 
done in a one-to-one setting with a trained researcher. Written informed consent was obtained 
from the participant prior to participation, followed by a verbal assessment by the researcher of 
all inclusion criteria. Participants completed the self-report measures first, followed by the 
death–identity IAT, death–identity IRAP, and death–evaluation IRAP. It should be noted that 
previous research suggests that the order of completion of self-report and implicit measures has 
minimal impact on the results of either (Nosek et al., 2005), therefore we elected to follow the 
common convention of presenting the self-report measures first. The order of the three implicit 
measures was fully counterbalanced between participants. Upon completion of all tasks, 
participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their time. No remuneration was offered. 
Death–Identity IAT 
The IAT consisted of two instruction screens followed by seven blocks, each of which 
consisted of a number of trials. The pre-block instruction screens contained the following written 
instructions: 
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“For this portion of the study, words will appear one at a time in the middle of the 
screen. Classify those words into groups which will be designated with labels 
appearing on the top half of the screen.  All words belonging to the groups on the 
left will be classified with the “e” key.  All words belonging to the groups on the 
right will be classified with the “i” key. Classify the words as quickly as possible 
while making as few mistakes as possible. Accuracy and speed are both important. 
Pay close attention to the group labels, they will change from block to block.  
Direct any questions to the experimenter.” 
“For the next portion of this study, you will be asked to classify words into the 
categories of DEATH and LIFE, as well as words related to ME and NOT ME. 
The words related to each of the categories are shown below.  Remember, when 
the word in the center corresponds to the category on the left, you will use the “e” 
key, and when the word in the center corresponds to the category on the right, you 
will use the “i” key. Classify the words as quickly as possible while making as 
few mistakes as possible.” 
 
Table 3. The length and content of the IAT blocks (adapted from Nosek et al., 2007, p.268). 
Block Number of trials Categories assigned to the “e” key  
Categories assigned to the “i” 
key 
1 20 Self  Other  
2 20 Death  Life  
3 20 Self + death  Other + life  
4 40 Self + death  Other + life  
5 40 Other  Self  
6 20 Other + death  Self + life  
7 40 Other + death  Self + life  
Note: The order of presentation of the category pairings in blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7 (i.e., self–
death/others–life vs. self–life/others–death) was counterbalanced between participants.  
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Before each block, the message “Check categories - Press space bar when ready” 
appeared at the bottom of the screen. A trial was defined as the time in milliseconds from the 
onset of a stimulus to the emission of a correct response. The numbers of trials in each block and 
the classes of stimuli presented in each are presented in Table 3. The stimulus categories (self, 
other, death, life) remained on the top left and top right of the screen throughout each block. Self 
and other related words were presented in white, whereas death and life related words were 
presented in green. Each trial presented the to be categorized stimulus in the middle of the screen. 
Participants responded using the “e” and “i” keys. If an incorrect response was emitted, a red “X” 
was displayed below the stimulus, and a correct response was required before proceeding to the 
next trial. After each trial the stimulus in the middle of the screen was cleared for an inter-trial 
interval of 250ms. 
IRAPs 
Participants were verbally instructed in how to complete the IRAP in several stages using 
a prewritten script (Hussey, 2015), which was developed as part of an ongoing effort to minimize 
attrition rates from the task. Therefore, in contrast to much previously published research (e.g., 
Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), no additional written or onscreen instructions were 
provided. The experimenter’s verbal instructions for the death–identity IRAP contained the 
following key points, which were delivered before the participant completed the first practice 
block. If a participant indicated a lack of clarity around any point, as the researcher worked 
through the script, that point was reiterated and clarified to the participant’s satisfaction. The 
instructions for the death–evaluation IRAP were identical other than the specific stimuli that 
were referred to.  
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1. Participants were instructed that they would be presented with pairs of words related 
to “self”, “others”, “death” and “life”, and would be asked to respond to those pairs as 
being “Similar” or “Different”. 
2. They were informed that, unlike a questionnaire that asked for their subjective 
opinion, this behavioral task simply required that they follow a rule, and this rule 
would be provided on screen.  
3. Next, they were instructed that the rule would swap after each block, that there were 
only two rules, and that they would be reminded of the rule for the following block on 
screen.  
4. It was emphasized that they were to initially go as slowly as they needed to get as 
many trials as possible ‘right’ according to the rule, and that they would naturally 
become faster with practice. Furthermore, it was emphasized to each participant that 
they must learn how to be accurate before they could learn to go both quickly and 
fluently. Once they had learned to be accurate they should then naturally learn to 
speed up. 
5. Finally, they were then informed that they would complete pairs of practice blocks 
until they learned to meet accuracy and speed criteria that would be presented at the 
end of the block. Once these were met on both blocks within a pair, they would then 
complete three pairs of test blocks.  
The IRAP task consisted of up to three pairs of practice blocks and exactly three pairs of 
test blocks. Each block included (a) a preblock rule screen; (b) 24 trials; and (c) a postblock 
feedback screen. The preblock rule screen contained the responding rule for the forthcoming 
block (rule A or rule B, see above), as well as the instructions “Try to get as many as possible 
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‘right’ according to the rule. If you go over time on any trial “!” will appear. If you get one 
wrong an “X” will appear – press the correct response to continue.” Each trial presented 
participants with one label stimulus at the top of the screen, one target stimulus in the middle of 
the screen, and the response options on the bottom left and bottom right of the screen. The 
correct response option differed depending on the trial-type and alternated between the blocks, in 
line with the rules presented before that block. Participants responded using the “d” and “k” keys. 
If an incorrect response was emitted, a red “X” was displayed below the stimulus, and a correct 
response was required before proceeding to the next trial. After each trial the stimulus in the 
middle of the screen was cleared for an intertrial interval of 400 ms. The postblock feedback 
screen displayed both the participant’s percentage accuracy and median latency performance on 
the previous block and the mastery criteria (i.e., accuracy ≥ 80% and median latency ≤ 2000 ms). 
Data processing 
The primary datum produced by both the IAT and IRAP is reaction time in millisecond 
from the onset of a trial to the first correct response. Effects on both the IAT and IRAP are 
defined as the latency difference between the two blocks in a block pair (e.g., rule A block vs. 
rule B block). The IAT provides one overall bias score (e.g., “life–self/death–others”), whereas 
the IRAP provides four, one for each of the trial-types (e.g., “life–self”, “life–others”, “death–
self”, and “death–others”). The effects on both measures were quantified using the D score, 
which has been found to limit the impact of extraneous variables such as responding speed and 
age (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Briefly, D scores were calculated as follows. First, 
latencies above 10,000 ms were removed. Then, for each pair of blocks, D is equal to the 
difference between mean block A reaction times and mean block B reaction times, divided by the 
standard deviation of the reaction times from both rule A and rule B blocks. In the current article, 
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reaction times from rule B blocks were always subtracted from rule A blocks. There are some 
differences in the calculation of D between the IAT and IRAP, which will now be discussed. 
IAT data processing. D scores were calculated separately for the practice block pair 
(blocks 3 & 4) and test block pair (blocks 6 & 7) before being averaged to create a final D score. 
Previous research has demonstrated that excluding participants’ IAT data based on accuracy or 
latency (e.g., accuracy ≥ 80%, median latency ≤ 2000ms) criteria does not significantly increase 
the reliability or validity of the measure (Nosek et al., 2007). As such, no such data exclusion 
criteria were applied here. Positive D scores represented quicker responding on rule A blocks 
(i.e., where self was coordinated with death and others was coordinated with life) relative to rule 
B blocks (i.e., where self was coordinated with life and others was coordinated with death). This 
can be interpreted as a “self–death/others–life” effect. In contrast, negative D scores represented 
the opposite pattern of responding, where responding on rule B blocks was quicker than on rule 
A blocks. This can be interpreted as a “self–life/others–death” effect. 
IRAP data processing. As with the majority of previous research using the IRAP, one D 
score for each of the IRAP’s four individual trial-types (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 
2010). Practice block data were not included in the analysis. Accuracies on the IRAP are 
typically lower than the IAT. As such, in order to ensure that IRAP effects were derived from 
performances that involved the targeted patterns of stimulus control, D scores were excluded if a 
participant failed to maintain the mastery criteria in the test blocks. Although a number of 
specific exclusion strategies could in principle be applied, the current study adopted the method 
employed by Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes (2012) because it equally balances the two goals of 
removing unwanted performances and minimizing attrition. Following these authors’ approach, 
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D scores from IRAP test blocks that failed to meet criteria were excluded from the analysis in the 
following manner: 
1. If accuracy on one or both test blocks within a pair was < 78% and/or median latency 
was > 2000ms, then the four D scores from that test block pair were excluded.  
2. If only one of a participant’s three test block pairs were excluded in this manner, the 
final D scores were calculated by averaging the D scores across the two remaining 
test block pairs. D scores for three participants were calculated on this basis.  
3. If more than one of a participant’s three test block pairs were excluded in this manner, 
all of the data from that particular IRAP was excluded from the analysis. IRAP data 
for three participants were removed on this basis. 
Following convention, D scores for two of the four trial-types were inverted. In this case, 
trial-types 3 and 4 on both the death–identity and death–evaluation IRAPs were inverted so as to 
create a common axis within each IRAP. Specifically, for the death–identity IRAP, the others–
life and others–death trial–types were multiplied by -1. Positive D scores on this IRAP therefore 
represented “death” or “not-life” effects, whereas negative D scores represented “life” or “not-
death” effects, depending on whether the stimuli within that trial-type referred to life or death, 
respectively. For example, if a positive D score was found on trial-type 1 this would be 
interpreted as a “self–death” effect (i.e., participants responded to self and death with “similar” 
more rapidly than with “different”); in contrast, if a negative D score was found it would be 
interpreted as a “self–not-death” effect (i.e., participants responded to self and death with 
“different” more rapidly than with “similar”). Axes were therefore arranged in a similar manner 
to the IAT in order to allow for comparison. That is, on both measures, positive scores 
represented prodeath effects and negative scores represented prolife effects.  
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A comparable set of inversions was applied to the death–evaluation IRAP: D scores for 
the “death–positive” and “death–negative” trial-types were multiplied by -1. This IRAP 
employed “True” and “False” as response options and, as such, positive D scores represented 
“positive” or “not-negative” effects, whereas negative D scores represented “negative” or “not-
positive” effects (see Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2015 for an article length discussion of the inversion and interpretation of IRAP trial-type 
effects). 
Results 
Self-report measures 
The sample reported normative levels of depression (M = 4.6, SD = 4.8), hopelessness (M 
= 4.7, SD = 4.0), psychological flexibility (M = 19.9, SD = 8.4), and death anxiety (M = 8.1, SD 
= 2.0). The sample was roughly equally divided by their belief in the afterlife (N = 12 low belief, 
N = 12 ambivalent belief, N = 20 high belief; M = 35.5, SD = 17.3). Results from the self-report 
measures therefore indicated that the sample could be considered to represent normative levels of 
psychopathology and attitudes to death.  
Death identity IAT 
The sample produced an overall “self–life/others–death” effect on the IAT, as 
hypothesized (M = -0.34, SD = 0.43: see Figure 1). That is, participants were faster to pair self 
with life and others with death than self with death and others with life. A one sample t-test 
showed that this effect was significantly different from zero, t(41) = -5.2, p < 0.001. Participants 
were therefore faster to categorize stimuli when self was coordinated with life and others was 
coordinated with death relative to when self was coordinated with death and others was 
coordinated with life. However, as discussed previously, the nature of the IAT precludes the 
DEATH–IDENTITY AND DEATH–EVALUATION IRAPS      20 
ability to determine which specific relational responses drove this effect (i.e., self–life, self–death, 
others–life, others–death). IAT D scores were not correlated with age, depression, hopelessness, 
psychological flexibility, belief in the afterlife, or death anxiety (all ps > .05, see Table 4).  
When IAT D scores were binarized using zero as a cutoff score, as employed by previous 
research (Nock et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2013), 32 participants were shown to have overall 
“self–life/others–death” effects (i.e., D scores ≤ 0) and 7 participants were shown to have overall 
“self–death/others–life” effects (i.e., D scores > 0). The majority of the sample (82%) therefore 
demonstrated effects on the IAT that were consistent with what previous research has classified 
as low risk of attempted suicide or self-harm, as might be expected within a normative sample.  
 
Table 4. Correlations between the implicit and self-report measures. 
 DI-IAT DASS-D BHS AAQ-II BIA TDA Age 
Death–identity IAT 1.0 .19 .23 .27 -.09 .18 .03 
Death–identity IRAP        
Self–death .04 -.09 .00 .05 .14 -.05 -.12 
Self–life -.16 -.07 .03 .15 -.10 .07 -.30 
Others–death .14 -.22 -.14 -.31 .01 -.15 .15 
Others–life .12 -.15 -.06 -.26 .14 -.33* .17 
Death–evaluation IRAP        
Living–positive -.27 .05 .00 .21 .17 .04 .02 
Living–negative -.38* -.14 -.15 -.15 -.21 .03 .08 
Dying–positive .01 .05 .03 .06 .12 .09 .08 
Dying–negative -.07 .07 .26 .05 .01 -.01 .06 
Note: DI-IAT = death–identity IAT, DASS-D = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales’ depression 
subscale, BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II, 
TDA = Templer Death Anxiety scale. For ease of interpretation, correlations among the IRAP 
trial-types are not included here. 
* p < .05 
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Figure 1. Performance on the death identity IRAP and IAT. Positive scores represent “death” or 
“not-life” biases, whereas negative scores represent “life” or “not-death” biases. Bars 1–4 
represent mean D scores on the IRAP trial-types. Bar 5 represents mean IAT D scores. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance on the death evaluation IRAP. Positive scores represent “positive” or 
“not-negative” evaluative biases, whereas negative scores represent “negative” or “not-positive” 
evaluative biases. Bars represent mean D scores on each IRAP trial-type. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
  
38 5.080 .134
4 11.362 2.841 15.924 <.0001 63.696 1.000
152 27.114 .178
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value Lambda Power
Subject
Category for IRAP & IAT
Category for IRAP & IAT * Subject
ANOVA Table for IRAP & IAT
39 .079 .443 .071
39 -.489 .367 .059
39 .062 .373 .060
39 .053 .444 .071
39 -.350 .424 .068
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
Self-death
Self-life
Others-death
Others-life
IAT
Means Table for IRAP & IAT
Effect: Category for IRAP & IAT
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
D
 s
co
re
s
Self-death Self-life Others-death Others-life IAT
*** ***
*** p < .001
40 9.962 .249
3 5.267 1.756 11.427 <.0001 34.281 1.000
120 18.436 .154
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value Lambda Power
Subject
Category for death evaluation irap
Category for death evaluation irap * Subj...
ANOVA Table for death evaluation irap
41 .539 .383 .060
41 .162 .462 .072
41 .213 .409 .064
41 .059 .427 .067
Count Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err.
Living-positive
Living-negative
Dying-positive
Dying-neg tive
Means Table for death evaluation irap
Effect: Category for death evaluation irap
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
D
 s
co
re
s
Living-positive Living-negative Dying-positive Dying-negative
*** * **
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
DEATH–IDENTITY AND DEATH–EVALUATION IRAPS      22 
Death identity IRAP 
 Mean scores for the four death–identity IRAP trial-types and the death–identity IAT are 
presented in Figure 1, which demonstrates participants’ strong “self–life” biases (i.e., 
participants were faster to respond to “self” and “life” with “similar” relative to “different”). No 
strong effects were found on the other three trial-types (i.e., self–death, others–life & others–
death). It should be noted that the IAT is included in this figure only for the purposes of visual 
comparison, and was not included in the following ANOVA. A within subjects ANOVA 
confirmed significant differences between the IRAP trial-types F(3, 40) = 15.9, p < .0001. 
Follow up one sample t-tests demonstrated a significant “self–life” effect (p < 0.0001), but no 
other effects (all ps > .27: see Figure 1). This result therefore provides evidence for the 
assumptions made with previous research, whether explicitly or implicitly (e.g., Nock et al., 
2010; Dickstein et al., 2015) that normative participants do indeed demonstrate “self–life” effects 
specifically, as opposed to “self–not-death” biases.  
IRAP D scores were not correlated with age or self-reported depression, hopelessness, 
psychological flexibility, belief in the afterlife, or death anxiety (see Table 4), with one 
exception: death anxiety and the “others–life” trial-type (p < .05). Given the large number of 
correlations performed and the lack of a systematic pattern, however, this effect should be 
interpreted with extreme caution.  
Relationship between the death–identity IAT and IRAP 
Responses on the death–identity IAT demonstrated a “self–life/others–death” effect. In 
contrast, the results of the death–identity IRAP suggest that the IAT effect may have been driven 
by a “self–life” bias specifically, given that the biases on the other three trial-types were all 
relatively weak. A dependent t-test showed that the magnitude of the IRAP’s “self–life” trial-
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type did not differ significantly from the IAT D score, t(38) = 1.4, p = .16. On balance, however, 
a series of correlations failed to find any correlations between the IAT and any of the IRAP trial-
types, including the “self–life” trial-type (rs = -.16 to .14). 
Death evaluation IRAP 
Mean scores for the four death–identity IRAP trial-types and the death–identity IAT are 
presented in Figure 2. Participants’ demonstrated strong “life–positive” biases (i.e., they were 
faster to respond to “life” and “positive” with “true” relative to “false”). Smaller “life–not-
negative” and “death–positive” biases were also found. No biases were found on the “death–
negative” trial-type. A within subjects ANOVA demonstrated significant differences between the 
IRAP trial-types, F(3, 40) = 11.4, p < .0001. Follow up one sample t-tests demonstrated 
significant “life–positive”, “life–not-negative” and “death–positive” effects (all ps < .03: see 
Figure 2). Effects on the “death–negative” trial-type were not significantly different from zero (p 
= .38). As such, effects on the life related trial-types are relatively intuitive for a normative 
sample: participants confirm that life is positive and reject that it is negative. However, the 
“death is positive” effect is both unexpected and counterintuitive. That is, the sample responded 
“True” more quickly than “False” on the “death–positive” trial-type, despite reporting normative 
levels of depression, hopelessness, and death anxiety on the self-report measures. The absence of 
a “death–negative” effect is equally surprising. Specifically, a correlation matrix indicated that 
none of the IRAP trial-types were significantly correlated with age, depression, hopelessness, 
psychological flexibility, belief in the afterlife, or death anxiety (rs = -.21 to .26: see Table 4). 
Finally, it should be noted that a significant correlation was found between the “life–negative” 
trial-type and the death–identity IAT (r = -.38, p = .02). This indicates that a bias towards 
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rejecting that life is negative on the IRAP was associated with a “self–life/others–death” bias on 
the IAT.  
Discussion 
In the current study, participants were exposed to the death–identity IAT, which has 
previously been used to study attitudes to death and their relation to suicidality (e.g., Nock et al., 
2010; Dickstein et al., 2015). In addition, participants were asked to complete two versions of the 
IRAP, one that targeted death–identity and one that targeted death–evaluations. The IRAPs were 
designed to provide information on the strength of specific relational responses rather than 
overall biases, as is the case with the IAT. The key findings in this largely exploratory study 
were as follows. The “self–life/others–death” bias found in previous studies using the IAT with 
normative samples was replicated in the current results (i.e., Dickstein et al., 2015; Harrison et 
al., 2014; Tang et al., 2013; Violanti et al., 2013). Intuitively, one might expect that such biases 
reflect a general positivity to and preference for life over death. Indeed, such attitudes are 
reflected in many psychological theories (e.g., need for meaning in life, Greenberg et al., 1986; 
suicidality, Joiner, 2005). Somewhat unexpectedly, therefore, although both IRAPs employed in 
the current research produced biases that reflected strong “pro” life responses, they also 
produced either weak “anti” or “pro” death responses. Indeed, one trial-type (“death–positive” on 
the death–evaluation IRAP) was in a significant “pro” death direction. How might we explain 
this curious implicit bias that reflects the lack of an aversive response to death, or even more 
bizarrely, a bias towards it? 
At this stage, it is worth emphasizing that this was a normative sample of participants, 
and that the IRAP and IAT effects, in general, failed to correlate with, or even produce effects 
that were consistent with any of the self-report measures (i.e., death anxiety, belief in the 
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afterlife). As such, it would be difficult to explain these implicit biases as reflecting the 
participants’ self-reported beliefs and attitudes towards death or dying or as indicators of non-
normative attitudes to death, such as suicidality (i.e., hopelessness, depression). Indeed, as 
discussed in the introduction, positive evaluations of death in normative participants run contrary 
to a wide range of psychological theories of death and suicidality, which assume that death is 
aversive and/or negatively evaluated (e.g., Joiner, 2005; O’Connor, 2011). It should also be 
noted that such findings are not readily explained via cultural differences, for example, given that 
Irish samples have been shown to have similar attitudes to death as participants from other 
cultural backgrounds (Weafer, 2014). 
Given that we cannot appeal readily to something specific or unusual about the sample of 
participants, perhaps we should consider the impact of the stimuli employed within the IRAPs. 
Specifically, it is possible that the death related words employed were not strongly valenced, 
particularly for a sample of young college students. In other words, death and mortality may be 
so far removed from the immediate psychological awareness of a young person that these words 
lack the salience to produce relatively strong IRAP effects (i.e., on the death–identity IRAP). 
Thus, it might be useful to consider the possible effects of using death related words that are less 
abstract to a young person, in the sense that they refer to more proximal adverse events. For 
example, the word “cancer” would likely have been more evocative of specific functions (e.g., 
pain, frailty, fear: see Barnes-Holmes, Keane, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000) because these 
may have been observed directly in a family member who contracted the disease. Of course, 
while this explanation may account for the absence of death biases on one IRAP (i.e., death–
identity), it is harder to explain the presence of a “death–positive” effect on the other IRAP (i.e., 
death–evaluation). 
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One alternative explanation for these patterns of bias might be found in the stimuli that 
were included in the IRAPs. First, it should be noted that the death related stimuli differed 
between the death–identity and death–evaluation IRAPs, both in the number of exemplars and 
the specific stimuli employed (see Tables 1 & 2). It is possible that this difference may 
contribute to any differences between them. Possibly more importantly, death can have a variety 
of valence functions depending on the context. For example, death could involve a lonely, 
painful decline, or it could involve a romantic (e.g., Romeo and Juliet) or heroic (e.g., Martin 
Luther King) demise. Furthermore, in this era of computer gaming, death may be associated with 
excitement and reversible at the press of a button. In retrospect, it is therefore difficult to know 
exactly what functions of death the stimuli evoked within the IRAPs. Perhaps future studies 
might seek to narrow the range of likely functions that their stimulus sets target. For example, 
future work might at minimum specify a relevant deictic relation. That is, whose death is being 
referred to (personal death, death of a specified other, death of an unspecified other, etc.)?  
The absence of correlations between the death–identity IAT and IRAP is also worth 
commenting upon. This result was somewhat surprising, given that the two measures employed 
highly similar stimuli. On balance, previous research has reported mixed results in this regard, 
with some studies reporting correlations between implicit measures and others not (Bosson, 
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; see also Golijani-Moghaddam, Hart, & Dawson, 2013 for review). 
Of course, the two tasks do bear important methodological differences. For example, as a relative 
measure, the IAT presents all four categories on each trial, whereas the IRAP presents only one 
of the four possible pairings of these categories per trial. Thus, the lack of a strong and consistent 
relationship between the measures, which is hardly unique in the literature, should not cause 
excessive concern for the current study. It should also be noted that the lack of correlation 
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between the IAT and IRAP should not necessarily be interpreted as problematic for either 
measure, given that meta analyses have shown both to be have relatively high levels of predictive 
validity in clinically relevant domains (see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Vahey et al., 2015 for reviews). 
We would recommend that the unexpected effects for the two death trial-types found in 
the current study (i.e., presence of a “death-positive” bias and absence of a “death-negative” 
bias) should be further explored in future research. There are at least two ways in which this 
might be pursued. First, future work might pose questions about the relevant effects in terms of 
understanding relational response biases in the context of suicidal behaviors. For example, one 
might compare evaluations of death on the IRAP between normative individuals and those with a 
history of suicidal behavior (e.g., ideation and/or attempts). Second, future research might seek 
to better understand the behavioral processes involved in IRAP performances themselves (e.g., 
Hussey, Ní Mhaoileoin, et al., 2015). In so doing, we would be in a better position to explain 
how unexpected or counterintuitive patterns of bias emerge. This latter strategy would require us 
to move beyond the notion of the IRAP as a measure of “implicit attitudes” and towards 
understanding it as a measure of natural verbal relations (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Hussey, in press; Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2015).  
For illustrative purposes, consider that the largest bias on the death–evaluation IRAP was 
produced on the “life–positive” trial-type, whereas the “death–negative” trial-type was relatively 
weak (and non-significant) by comparison. One possible explanation is that the valence of the 
stimuli presented within the “life–positive” trial-type was more easily associated with the “True” 
response option, whereas the valence of the stimuli presented for the “death–negative” trial-type 
was more easily associated with the “False” response option (assuming that “True” is more 
positively valenced than “False”). If this was the case, then any response bias towards “True”, 
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when confirming that death is negative, may have been reduced somewhat by a competing bias 
to associate negatively valenced stimuli with the negatively valenced response option (“False”).  
A related explanation might appeal to a general positivity bias to which the IRAP may be 
sensitive (see Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010, pp.75-76). For 
example, all things being equal, in natural language interactions speakers tend to emphasize the 
positive over the negative, reporting for instance that a glass is half full rather than half empty 
(see Dodds et al., 2015, for evidence that this effect is observed across numerous languages). 
Given that the IRAP was specifically designed to capture differential probabilities (or biases) in 
patterns of verbal or relational responding that are found in natural language (Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008) it seems reasonable to assume that such biases may 
also be reflected in IRAP performances. Indeed, one would hope so if the IRAP is to be 
considered a measure of the response patterns found in natural language (see O’Shea, Watson, & 
Brown, 2015 for empirical evidence to support this claim). In fact, it might even be important to 
capture such positivity biases if the variance they create helps to increase the prediction of 
criterion variables by the IRAP (see Vahey et al., 2015). In this context, it is worth noting that 
unpublished research from our group using a Life-Death IRAP similar to those employed in the 
current study successfully predicted self-harm and suicide ideation using a known-groups design 
(Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Perhaps the interaction, or response competition, between 
general positivity biases and specific response biases towards the positive and negative aspects 
of life and death were jointly responsible for producing the observed level of predictive validity. 
In any case, future research into this intriguing possibility certainly seems warranted.  
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